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The US Farm Bill of 2002 is the latest in a 7-decade history of farm subsidy
laws that transfer funds to farmers and regulate and subsidize production of
selected commodities. Fruit, tree nut, ornamental and vegetable crops, hay and
meats remain outside scope of main subsidy programs. The new law continues
many innovations of the 1996 Act, such as removal of authority for annual land
idling and crop price ﬂoors accompanied by government stockholding. Govern-
ment payments remain the primary focus of commodity programs. The total
amount of these payments are likely to remain similar to the amount paid in the
period 1999–2001, but with some changes in the form of the programs. For example,
allowing owners to update acreage and yield payment bases creates additional
incentives for farmers to link current planting decisions to anticipated farm sub-
sidies. Similarly, the new program that ties “counter-cyclical” payments to the price
of a speciﬁc crop also has production stimulus. A new program, estimated to add
about 5–10 per cent to marginal milk revenue for smaller farms, makes ‘deﬁciency’
payments to dairy farms when milk prices are low. Despite the new programs with
added links to stimulating production, new USA programs stimulate production
only marginally more than the subsidies of the 1999–2001 period, which were
replaced. Furthermore, the USA has ﬂexibility to avoid explicitly violating its
WTO commitments. Nonetheless, this US Farm Bill of 2002 has curtailed the
previous trends toward lower farm subsidies and smaller production stimuli, and





The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRIA), as the
new US Farm Bill is formally known, garners international attention for
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several reasons. First, the USA is a major producer, consumer, exporter
and importer of many agricultural commodities. Behaviour of producers,
consumers, and marketing ﬁrms in the USA can inﬂuence world markets.
USA policies, thus, have the potential to affect price expectations and price
realisations in major commodity markets around the world. Second, for
many years the USA government has played a major role in international
trade negotiations, including at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Because its provisions may affect trade and because trade agreements also
discipline USA policy, the Farm Bill may affect the negotiating positions of
the USA or the positions of other countries. In this way the Farm Bill may
affect international trade rules and these, in turn, inﬂuence policies in other
countries and international commodity markets. Third, the Farm Bill might
conﬂict with USA compliance with existing international agreements and
thus lead to international disputes. Such disputes affect markets directly,
affect trade negotiations and may slow the pace of global policy reform.
Finally, for approximately 2 decades the USA was on a path of gradual
reform to make its policies more consistent with market forces and trade
liberalisation. Some international observers and policy makers have looked
to the USA experience for lessons about the effects of farm policy, and
therefore, policy change in the USA may inﬂuence policy reform prospects
in other countries.
For more than 6 decades the USA has periodically renewed and reformu-
lated legislation authorising domestic farm subsidy programs. For example,
the Food and Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996
covered years 1996 to 2002, replacing the Farm, Agriculture, Conservation
and Trade (FACT) Act of 1990 (together with the farm spending portions
of the Omnibus Budget Reauthorization Act of 1990), which replaced the
Food Security Act of 1985. Each of these laws authorised farm commodity
programs for between 5 and 7 years and took the legal form of temporary
amendments of the so-called ‘permanent’ authorising legislation of 1949.
The 1949 Act itself was just one of the periodical laws that have governed
the production and marketing of selected farm commodities in the USA
since the mid 1930s (Olmstead and Sumner, in press). In its time, each of
these laws has been known as ‘the Farm Bill’ and the 2002 Farm Bill is just
the latest in this long line of legislation.
Farm bills typically deal with many topics far broader than farm com-
modity subsidies. Over the years the laws have become ever more compre-
hensive and complex. They are comprised of many separate titles, which
deal with such diverse topics as food assistance for the poor, research and
extension support, food safety, and aid to rural communities for sewage
treatment or electricity. Farm bills also include a diverse set of programs
that affect farming. These include authorisation for conservation-based 
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land reserves, subsidies for some farm environmental improvements, and
updates of selected commodity marketing regulations. In the international
arena, recent farm bills have included authorisation of export price subsi-
dies, subsidies for international promotion, food aid, and export credit
guarantee programs. The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
is no exception to the trend – this bill is complex and diverse and includes
all these items and more. Farm bills do not set tariff rates and do not
implement trade agreements.
The present article reviews the 2002 Farm Bill in the USA with attention
to those features of the legislation that are likely to be of the most interest
in the international community generally and WTO negotiations in partic-
ular. In recognition of space limitations, I will leave aside many topics that
are important within the USA, but of less importance to agricultural
observers and market participants outside the USA (USDA 2002). The
relationship between the Farm Bill and the Uruguay Round Agreements on
Agriculture (URAA) and the ongoing WTO negotiations are a major part
of the present paper.
 
2. Clariﬁcation about USA agriculture and USA farm policy
 
While USA agriculture is large and diverse, about 90 per cent of all farm
program payments, which are the traditional focus of farm bill debates, are
provided to a small range of crops – grains, oilseeds (now including peanuts)
and cotton that produce about 40 per cent of farm cash receipts. Several
minor or specialty commodities such as honey and wool also receive sub-
stantial payments relative to the size of the industries. Dairy is supported
by a complex set of marketing regulations that allows price discrimination
within the USA, by trade barriers, a small export subsidy program and direct
payments. A few other commodities, notably beef, sugar, peanuts and frozen
concentrated orange juice have signiﬁcant trade barriers. But, despite crop
insurance subsidies, disaster aids, marketing regulations and occasional
ad hoc programs, government subsidy or protection for most of the rest
of USA agriculture is quite low. In particular, the meats, fruits and tree
nuts, vegetables and melons, ornamental crops, and hay crops receive
almost no program payments and, even including import barriers (with a
few exceptions, such as frozen concentrated orange juice), have little sup-
port compared to the program crops and sugar. The average producer
support for these commodities, which comprise more than half of USA
agriculture, is less than 10 per cent of total revenue, and this ﬁgure includes
broad support such as research and extension. In discussing commodity
programs in the FSRIA we should not loose sight of which commodities
are left out. 
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3. 2002 context: prices, policy and WTO disciplines
 
The FAIR Act was negotiated in 1995 while many farm commodity prices
were at historical highs. This price situation allowed the law to increase
payments to farmers in the short term while projecting lower long-term
payment commitments relative to what would have been allocated under
previous law. The FAIR Act eliminated land set-asides and continued the
move toward reducing the link between direct farm payments and current
production or prices. Payment rules allowed farmers to plant alternative
crops or leave the land idle. These Agricultural Market Transition Act
(AMTA) payments were the centerpiece of FAIR Act reforms known as
‘Freedom to Farm’.
The FAIR Act also continued the use of payments rather than government
purchases and stock management in the case of very low prices. For
decades, farm bills had set ﬂoor prices at which the USDA acquired program
crops and held them in government-administered stockpiles. Under the market-
ing loan scheme, often implemented by Loan Deﬁciency Payments (LDP), the
government simply pays the difference between the government-set loan
rate (a price support for producer prices) and the loan repayment rate (the
price at which government price support loans are repaid. The loan
repayment rate varies with the market price for the crop (with different
procedures for different crops). This scheme provides a price ﬂoor for
growers, but removes the government from the demand-side and allows the
crop to be marketed through normal channels. For wheat, feed grains and
soybeans the loan rates were set at rates roughly equivalent to 70 per cent
to 85 per cent of the moving average of past prices, with some ﬁxed mini-
mums, and was expected to be triggered only in the most unusual of cir-
cumstances. (The marketing loan approach was introduced for rice and
cotton in the 1985 Act.) Nonetheless, after 3 years of high prices, the
collapse in prices in 1997 and 1998 caused large marketing loan beneﬁts to
be distributed. The magnitude of payments grew rapidly and remained high
through most of 2002.
While the farm bills make international headlines, the USA enacts
signiﬁcant changes in agricultural policies almost every year. For example,
over the past few years there have been changes in crop insurance pro-
grams, disaster assistance and dairy marketing orders. Overshadowing all
of those, however, were annual ad hoc increases in the payments, which
had been supposedly set for seven years in the 1996 Fair Act. In 1998, the
legislated payment rates were raised by 50 per cent and named Market
Loss Assistance (MLA) payments. For each of the years 1999, 2000 and
2001 the direct payment rates were doubled under annual MLA legislation.
The consensus among all farm program observers is that the payment 
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rates would have been doubled again for 2002 if the FSRIA had not
intervened.
In summary, going into the debate on the 2002 Farm Bill, three farm pay-
ment programs were making record payments to growers of program crops.
These were (i) the AMTA payments, which were not tied to current produc-
tion or prices; (ii) MLA payments that were not tied to current production;
but were motivated by low commodity prices; and (iii) the marketing loan
beneﬁts (LDP) that were tied directly to current production of a speciﬁc
commodity and calculated to offset low prices for that commodity.
Consider next how the FAIR Act and subsequent ad hoc legislation
related to the URAA of the WTO. (I will not review the URAA in any
detail here. For a brief review of the URAA in the context of farm trade
negotiations see Sumner and Tangermann 2002) Remember, USA farm
bills do not typically deal directly with import tariffs or tariff rate quotas
(TRQ). The USA schedule of import barrier reductions and related rules
was set in the implementing legislation in 1994. Farm bills have historically
authorised export subsidies, and the FAIR Act continued that tradition by
authorising the continuation of export price subsidy programs at URAA
maximums, even though these were not then being used for grains and have
not been used subsequently. Export subsidies have become a minor issue in
recent USA policy discussion.
The main connection between recent farm legislation and the WTO
relates to domestic support and the computation of Aggregate Measure of
Support (AMS) limits. The AMS indicates the amount of subsidy that is
presumed to affect trade signiﬁcantly and therefore is liable to be reduced
according to WTO rules. Figure 1 shows the total direct support of the
USA in categories used in implementing the URAA. For the period 1995




6 billion and far below the cap




20 billion for that period. The FAIR act did nothing to
change the AMS. Under the FACT Act of 1990, USA payment programs
qualiﬁed as those not subject to AMS reduction commitments because
mandatory land idling or speciﬁc limitations on the share of output that
qualiﬁed for payments were included in the program. For 1996 and thereafter,
the AMTA payment program qualiﬁed as ‘minimally trade distorting’ or
‘green box’ and therefore not subject to restrictions because payments had
very limited ties to current production of any speciﬁc commodity. Figure 1
documents that, starting in 1998, the USA support levels jumped and the
AMS jumped as well. Two sets of payments responded to low commodity
prices. The marketing loan beneﬁts are product-speciﬁc and tied directly to
production and prices of speciﬁc commodities. They account for the rise in
the AMS. The MLA payments were not tied to production of any speciﬁc
crop but were linked to low prices (at least through Congressional intent). 
104 D.A. Sumner
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
 
Therefore they have been designated non-product-speciﬁc amber support in
the WTO notiﬁcations. Figure 1 shows how the exempt non-product-speciﬁc
(NPS de minimis exempt) support jumped in 1998 and jumped again in
1999 when the amount of ad hoc payments was raised further. Because the
USA provides relatively little support for most commodities, even with these
payments added, the total NPS support remained less than ﬁve per cent of













billion) and so these payments did not contribute to the AMS that is sub-
ject to WTO reduction commitments.
Details for the last ofﬁcial USA notiﬁcation to the WTO are presented in
Table 1 (adapted from Nelson 2002). This table provides a useful overview
of the way USA programs related to WTO commitments. The AMS was
mainly comprised of price support for dairy, sugar and peanuts plus mar-
keting loan beneﬁts. Importantly, the dairy support price relative to the




4.3 billion of the AMS,
and this policy provides almost no support in addition to that provided by
the dairy trade barriers. The NPS amber box support, which was outside
the AMS, was mainly comprised of the ad hoc payments and crop insur-
ance subsidies. Finally, the green box support was mainly comprised of the
Figure 1 Total direct support reported to the WTO: USA AMS approaches the ceiling. 
j, AMS;  , NPS de minimis exempt; h, Other exempt 
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decoupled payments, plus payments for the long-term land idling in the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and miscellaneous payments.
The context for the 2002 Farm Bill included low farm prices in the USA
and a perception on the part of some farm groups that the FAIR Act and
the URAA did not create farm prosperity as promised and so these policy
reforms had failed. This, together with a budget surplus when the legislative
process began, was enough to ensure that farm spending would not be
reduced from the recent amounts.
Let us now turn to consider some of the features of the 2002 Act so we
can see how it relates to WTO commitments and negotiations.
 
4. Farm security and rural investment act of 2002
 
Ofﬁcial reports from the USA Congressional Budget Ofﬁce have been inter-
preted to mean that farm commodity spending will increase radically under
the FSRIA. That is only true if we compare projections under the new law to
projected spending under the FAIR Act and ignore the ad hoc legislation
that was in place every year since 1998. The FSRIA does not increase com-
modity program spending compared to programs that have actually been in
place since 1999. In effect, the FSRIA makes the ad hoc spending included
in the MLA programs a regular part of the legislation for the next 6 years.
However, the form of spending changes somewhat and this has raised
controversy. Even before the legislation was enacted, David Orden (2002),
Table 1 USA direct support to agricultural producers in 1998 notiﬁed to WTO







Amber Box Dairy price support 4.33 0 4.33
Product Speciﬁc* Loan deﬁciency payments & 
marketing loans
3.82 0.03 3.79
Other 2.39 0.08 2.27
Amber Box Payments (0.5 AMTA) 2.81 2.81 0
Non-product-Speciﬁc* Crop Insurance  0.75 0.75 0
Other 1.03 1.03 0




Disaster 1.41 1.41 0
Environment and Credit 0.35 0.35 0
Total 24.24 13.81 10.39
WTO Ceiling na na 20.70
AMS, aggregate measure of support; AMTA, agricultural market transition act.
* Subsidies not in AMS ceiling if less than 5 per cent of applicable revenue
Source: Nelson, Frederick J. Agricultural Outlook, ERS, USDA. January–February 2002 
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for example, argued that the 2002 Act represents a reversal of the reforms
of the past 15 years.
 
4.1 Selected provisions affecting commodity markets and trade
 
The FSRIA authorises additional subsidies in its conservation and environ-
mental sections. Notably, the CRP ceiling increases from 36.4 million acres to
39.2 million acres, so that additional land will be removed from crop pro-
duction for 10-year periods. Money is also added to subsidies for farmers to
implement environmentally friendly practices in the environmental quality
incentives program. Furthermore, a small new ‘Conservation Security Pro-
gram’ provides annual payments to farms that use environmentally approved
practices.
Trade provisions are a relatively minor part of the FSRIA and change little.
The Export Enhancement Program is once again authorised at the WTO
maximum limits, but (once again) no one expects the program to be used in
a signiﬁcant way. The law continues food aid and export credit subsidy pro-




200 million per year, the authorised
subsidy for industry efforts to promote USA farm products in export mar-
kets, known now as the Market Access Program (MAP). The MAP program,
which is heavily used by the otherwise minimally subsidised commodities,
provides matching funds for industry promotions overseas. It is not clear
how effective these export programs are and they have not been treated as
export subsidies in the WTO.
Another trade provision requires labelling of imported meats and fresh
produce with their country of origin. For meat, the law requires labelling as
imported meat from livestock that was born or spent part of its life out of
the USA. Given the cross-border movement of livestock between the USA,
Canada and Mexico, this feature of the law will be very difﬁcult to imple-
ment. This program was clearly designed to disadvantage imports, but it
is unlikely to be a major factor in discouraging trade in general and is
unlikely to raise WTO issues. The importance of the import labelling law is
mainly symbolic and is a disquieting indication of the general protectionist
tenor that has recently colored much farm policy discussion in the USA.
(There is no requirement for labelling livestock fed with imported feed or
conceived using imported semen. Perhaps those are on the agenda.)
 
4.2 Payments for program crops
 
The commodity payment provisions in the law are the headline story and




20 billion in budget costs are found. There are
many details in the commodity title of the FSRI Act and some new ‘small’ 
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or specialised programs. These include a new peanut program to replace
marketing quotas and relatively small payments for apple growers. But here
we will concentrate on the main payment programs.
First consider loan rates. Table 2 shows that loan rates were raised for
corn and wheat, lowered for soybeans, with no change for rice and cotton.
(Marketing loan programs are also available for other feed grains, extra-
long staple cotton, other oilseeds, peanuts, wool, mohair, honey, and ﬁeld
peas and lentils.) The lowering of soybean loan rates corrects a widely
acknowledged problem with the FAIR Act that created incentives to plant
soybeans in place of other crops. Remember these ‘loan rates’ are now used
solely to determine the LDP or marketing loan beneﬁt rate whenever the
market price falls below the loan rate.


























where the loan rates, LR, vary by local areas and the quality of the crop
and the loan repayment rates, LRR, vary (along with market prices) weekly
by market conditions. The payments are applied to current production on
each farm, which equals harvested area, A, times yield, Y.
Higher loan rates for corn and wheat increase the expected cost of the
legislation signiﬁcantly and have WTO implications, because these subsi-
dies are clearly in the product-speciﬁc amber category. This feature of the
farm programs, the most production distorting payment program, has been
in place for many years for the main commodities, but was extended in
2002 to peas and lentils.
Table 2 also shows direct payments rates under FSRIA compared to the
FAIR Act payment rates that applied in 2001. The new direct payment













Wheat (#/bu) 2.58 0.53 2.75* 0.52 3.92*
Corn (#/bu) 1.89 0.30 1.95* 0.28 2.63*
Soybeans (#/bu) 5.26 NA 5.00 0.44 5.80
Cotton (#/lb) 0.5192 0.0667 0.52 0.0667 0.724
Rice (#/cwt) 6.50 2.35 6.50 2.35 10.50
* In 2002 and 2003 the wheat loan rate is #2.80 and the target price is #3.86. The corn loan rate is #1.98 
and the target price is #2.60.
FAIR, Food and Agriculture Improvement and Reform; FSRIA, Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002. 
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rates are approximately equal to the payment rates that applied in 2001,
except that now farms with a history of soybean or other oilseed produc-
tion will receive a direct payment and a new program was added for peanuts.
These payments were in the WTO green box under the FAIR Act.


















where D is the payment rate for base in crop j, BD is the base area established
for farm i, crop j and YD is the established historical yield for i and j. In the
FAIR act the BD and YD were based on the planting history on that farm
during the period 1981 to 1985. Many farmers planted other crops on this
land or left the land idle and still received their program payments. For the new
law, area bases may, at the farmer’s option, be updated to the 1998 to 2001
period. Because soybeans are now eligible for these payments, some base
updating would have been required to adjust for new assignments of base
areas to soybeans that had been planted on base area of other program crops.
The FAIR Act did not allow total ﬂexibility in the use of land receiving
these payments and restrictions continue. In particular, the payment land
may not be shifted out of agriculture altogether and the land may not be
used for fruits, tree nuts or vegetables and melons. These restrictions are of
little importance for most USA program crop land, but they do matter for
perhaps ﬁve per cent of the relevant area. For example, in California, vege-
table crops, fruits and tree nuts compete with program crops, in the north-
west potatoes and wheat compete for land and there are pockets in the
Midwest where vegetables have some presence.
The third payment program in the FSRIA replaces the ad hoc MLA pay-
ments that had been made from 1998 to 2001, and were on track to be dis-
tributed again in 2002. This new counter-cyclical payment (CCP) program
uses a target-price framework, but the distribution of payments is tied to
historical bases rather than current production. In this case, if the producer




) that farm may also update









































where TP is the target price (shown in Table 2 for the main program crops)
and NP is the national average market price. As with the loan beneﬁts these
payments are not allowed to be negative. The CCP is designed to supple-
ment the direct payment in times when the average price for the commodity
is lower than the target price. 
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While the payments are made on historical bases and are not tied to cur-
rent output of any speciﬁc crop, a higher probability that base areas and
base yields may be updated increases the supply response to these pay-
ments. Furthermore, because payment rates are tied to the market price of
a speciﬁc crop, for those growers planning to plant the eligible crop on the
base land, this payment provides a revenue off-set when prices are low.
The potential WTO concerns related to AMS calculations in the FSRIA
are evident. Anticipating such concerns, the law provides that, if commod-
ity support is projected to exceed the limits accepted by the USA in the
Uruguay Round Agreement, the Secretary of Agriculture must adjust sup-
port to comply with the WTO limits.
 
5. Implications of the FSRIA for production and prices of program crops
 
The implications of the 2002 Farm Bill for trade (and trade negotiations)
centre mainly (if sometimes indirectly) on its production subsidy implica-
tions, that is, the anticipated supply response to the various payment pro-
grams included. The issues are (i) the effects on production of various
crops; (ii) effects of this supply response on world supply and prices; (iii)
the compliance of the new payment schemes with URAA rules; and (iv) the
impact on the negotiating positions of the USA and others in the current
negotiations. The ﬁrst two of these issues are dealt with in this section.
For world markets the question is the change in commodity production
anticipated under the new law relative to previous law, and how that addi-
tional production would affect world prices. As a ﬁrst step we must clarify
our point of comparison. Many of the popular accounts and statements from
international observers have compared commodity program outlays under
the FSRI Act to the projected outlays under the FAIR Act without includ-
ing the MLA payments that were made every year since 1998. One repre-
sentative statement was from French President Jacques Chirac (REUTERS
2002) who noted that … ‘massive increases to [USA] farm subsidies would
hurt poor countries hardest – including those in Latin America’.
I argue that it is misleading to compare the FSRIA to the FAIR Act in a
form which was not actually applied. In fact, the new feature of the FSRIA,
the CCP program, was calibrated so that the projected payments roughly
equal the amount of the MLA payments that were made in 2001 and would
have been made in 2002. Thus, compared to programs that were actually
applied, the FSRIA does not increase the commodity payments signiﬁ-
cantly. In budget terms, a reversal of farm program reform in the USA
occurred in 1998 not 2002. Nonetheless, the FSRIA explicitly sets payment
program rules that are planned for the next 6 years, and thus replaces
annual ad hoc programs with what may be more secure funding. Of course, 
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Congress can still pass new laws that add to or subtract from the FSRIA.
In the 1990s, Congress lowered farm payment rates when budget deﬁcits
grew and then raised legislated payment rates later when the USA govern-
ment budget was in surplus. With that experience, it is also wrong to
claim, as some have done, that the FSRIA ‘locks in’ payments for the next
6 years.
For the rest of this section I will explicitly compare the FSRIA with the
programs that were in place for 1998 to 2001, and were on track for 2002,
before the new law replaced them.
The direct market implications of the FSRIA hinges on the supply response
to the new law. Estimation of agricultural supply response is difﬁcult in the
simplest of circumstances. Projecting the supply impact of this new legisla-
tion is exceedingly complex given the multi-commodity nature of the policies
and farming enterprises and because several impacts are indirect.
Some supply responses for program crops to the FSRIA may be consid-
ered by looking at the revenue ﬂows of program crop producers. The Act
does little to change marginal cost conditions signiﬁcantly for these pro-
ducers. Cross commodity impacts may also be important to consider, both
within the program crops and for other crops and livestock commodities.
Net revenue (NR) associated with the program crop may be written as the
sum of the three equations listed above plus market price (P) times area times
yield minus costs (C), which are also a function of area and yield. Obvi-
ously, many of these variables are only known approximately and expected




























































)(Bij YCCij) + Pijt(Aijt Yijt) - C(Aijt Yijt). (4)
In order to see the supply effects of the new law we need to think about
how the new law affects the derivative of the net revenue equation with
respect to production (harvested area times yield).
Direct expected marginal revenue from additional production is just,
price plus the marketing loan gain. However, there are a number of effects
of the new law on proﬁtability of planting program crops, and these may be
considered by examining equation (4) carefully and thinking about its
derivatives. Let us summarise some of the main inﬂuences.
The ﬁrst impact is straightforward. Because loan rates in the new law are
about 8 per cent higher for wheat, about 3 per cent higher for corn and
5 per cent lower for soybeans, we would expect a supply shift towards wheat
and corn and away from soybeans.
A second factor is not really new in the FSRIA but should be discussed
in this context. Some economists have argued that any government paymentsImplications of US Farm Bill 111
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tied to farmland increases production even if they are not tied to current
production (Roberts and Jotzo 2001). To the extent that more wealth on
farms reduces the interest rate faced for farm investments, this impact can
be built into supply response to the price of credit. There is little empirical
analysis available to suggest that this interest rate impact is large. Also
USA farmers are wealthy and the share of wealth tied to farm payments is
small in aggregate, although the additional liquidity may be important in
some cases. Further, a signiﬁcant share of payments goes to farm landlords
who are not active farmers. The credit effect is less direct for these payments.
Recent data shows that about 20 per cent of the land value of program crops
is attributable to farm payments, but 62 per cent of that land is owned by
non-operator landlords rather than farmers (Barnard et al. 2001).
A related argument is that payments reduce the risk of growing certain
crops. This is less obvious when one considers the undiversiﬁable policy risk
associated with these payments. Even so, the effect of reduced annual revenue
variability on production has not been adequately measured in a model in
which farmers have a portfolio of potential investments and income streams.
(Hennessy (1998) and Young and Westcott (2000) discuss related issues in
the context of FAIR Act payments. Both these papers suggest that the pro-
duction effects of direct payments with loose ties to current production are
small in aggregate.)
Third, consider the implications of replacing the ad hoc MLA payments
with the new counter-cyclical payments. As noted, the payment rate is tied
directly to the current price of the program crop and provides a price offset
for producers who continue to plant the program crop when market prices
are low. This reduces losses from downside price movements. Furthermore,
growers may place a higher probability on actually receiving the CCP in the
future because they are written into the continuing legislation.
The most interesting change in the FSRIA is the updating of the base
areas and base yields from the ﬁxed 1981–1985 bases in the old law. This
change has implications for markets and trade. Clearly, voluntary updating
to the recent period will cause more of the payments to ﬂow to those pro-
ducers who have grown more of the program crop recently. More important
for market effects and WTO considerations, updating in 2002 naturally
causes growers to revise estimates of the probability of future updating.
This means that, in considering what to plant on payment-base acres, the
effect on the present value of future payments becomes a more important
consideration. The empirical importance of this supply response has not
been investigated in practice. If growers expect a large effect of current area
and yield on the base used for future payments, then they will plant sub-
stantially more of the program crop now to build program base for the
future. We need to consider the degree of linkage between payments with112 D.A. Sumner
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potentially updated bases and current production. Then we need to estab-
lish how much a current update affects that degree of linkage.
Let us explore the degree of linkage between current production and pay-
ments and how this is affected by updating base area in a simpliﬁed case. In
Equation (5) the degree of linkage is the discounted sum over future years
of the product of (i) probability that program remains operative t years in
the future (Prob Gt) times (ii) the expected payment rate (conditional on
the program remaining in place) relative to the current payment rate (E(Rt/
Rn)) times (iii) the probability that an update occurs for year n + t (Prob
Ut) times (iv) the expected marginal effect of current area planted on the
new base (dBt/dAn) times (v) the expected marginal effect of the new base
on the payment rate in year n + t relative to the current program (dRt/dBt)/
(dRn/dBn). This last expression measures how the new base affects pay-
ments compared to how the current program operates in that regard. A
value of 1.0 for this term simply indicates that the future program payment
rate per unit of base will be the same as under the current program.
Degree of linkage = åt (1 + r)
-t (Prob Gt)(E(Rt/Rn))(Prob Ut)E
(dBt/dAn)E((dRt/dBt)/(dRn/dBn)). (5)
Consider a simpliﬁed example to ﬁx ideas about the magnitude of this link-
age starting with the probability of an update. A farmer believes that if an
update happens at all it will occur 5 years in the future. He assigns a
probability of 0.6 to this event (Prob U5 = 0.6) and a zero to the probability
of an update in other years. This simpliﬁes the present value calculation
and allows us to ignore other years in the probability calculations. Using a
discount rate of 0.10, the present value of income ﬁve years hence is 0.62 (a
discount rate of 5 per cent yields a discount factor of 0.78 and a discount
rate of 15 per cent yields a discount factor of 0.5). Now assume the farmer
places a probability (Prob Gt) of 0.9 on the program remaining in its cur-
rent form and an expected value of 0.9 for the payment rate 5 years hence
relative to the current payment rate (E(Rt/Rn)). The farmer also thinks that
there is a 90 per cent chance that, conditional on an update occurring, ofﬁ-
cials will use a 5-year moving average for the update and that the new
base will be used for 5 years. Under this scenario, the full value of the
added base will be used in the update so E(dBt/dAn) = 0.9. This factor is
important because how much a speciﬁc year’s acreage decision affects the
future base is unclear, even if a farmer were conﬁdent that updating were
likely. Note that for the update in the FSRIA, only the most recent 4 years
were used so the contribution of area planted in year t-5 (1997) to the base
in 2002 was zero. Furthermore, the yield update used a scaling factor of
0.935, which reduced the value of recent yield in an update. Next assumeImplications of US Farm Bill 113
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that the farmer believes that the same relationship between base and pay-
ments will be in place in year t as exists now, so this ratio is 1.0. Multiply-
ing these factors yields the following calculation: Degree of linkage =
(0.62)(0.9)(0.9)(0.6)(0.9)(1.0) = 0.27.
Under this simpliﬁed case, with numbers that are not unrealistic, we ﬁnd
that updated payments are 27 per cent as much linked to current produc-
tion as payments that are directly conditional on current production (such
as the LDP). That is, if the farmer increased area planted this year, the
expected present value of payments that will be made 5 years from now is
increased, when there is a chance that base will be updated. Different
growers have different expectations and thus different values for each of the
components that comprise this calculation. For example, if a farmer uses a
discount rate of 0.05 the resulting degree of linkage is 0.34 and if the farmer
uses a discount rate of 0.15 the resulting degree of linkage is 0.22.
Of course, some farmers had positive expectations of an update before
2002. The supply response to the update in the FSRIA relative to an
increase in a fully coupled payment is equal to the degree of linkage times
the change in the probability of future updates caused by the FSRIA.
Finally, conservation provisions must be considered in determining the
production and price effects of the new law. Most importantly, the FSRIA
authorises an additional 3 million acres of cropland to be idled gradually
under the CRP and loosens eligibility for land to enter the CRP based on
wildlife habitat. Much of this land will be removed from program crop
acres, especially wheat and feed grains. Based on the 15-year history of the
program, a reasonable guess is that one or two million acres of additional
program cropland will be taken out of production from this action alone.
This is a signiﬁcant effect that would by itself raise crop prices slightly.
The new Conservation Security Program provides payments to farmers
and thus will increase revenue per acre. This additional revenue will increase
crop supply marginally unless offset by a change in practices that reduces
crop yields. All commodities are eligible for this new program including
livestock farms. However the amount of funding is small, amounting to
about 0.1 per cent of farm revenue. Thus any supply effects that exist in the-
ory are almost surely tiny in practice.
Based on simple simulations and preliminary work reported by the Food
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) and underway at
USDA, the effects on market prices of the FSRIA, compared to the FAIR
Act, including the ad hoc MLA payments, may be summarised brieﬂy.
More detailed results await more complete simulations and more informa-
tion about implementation. Here, I will suggest impacts for the middle of
the implementation period, say 2004. It is also reasonable to consider the
dynamics of these impacts, as the loan rates and target prices are ﬁxed114 D.A. Sumner
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
and most models and analysts project gradually increasing crop prices in
the out-years of the law. Also, the production effects will be smaller for
2002 as the crops were mainly planted before the new law was signed,
although some farmers increased plantings in anticipation of the changes.
Production of wheat and corn in the USA are both likely to be slightly
higher under the new law (FAPRI (2002), using their cross-commodity
simulation model, estimates about 1 per cent higher production compared
to the FAIR Act with no ad hoc payments). The net overall supply impact
results from a balance between all the factors listed in the discussion of
equation (4) relative to the additional acreage withdrawn under the CRP.
Table 3 summarizes approximate effects.
The main reason for higher planted area of wheat and feed grains is the adjust-
ment of the loan rate relative to soybeans. Higher production implies market
prices for these crops will be slightly lower than would have occurred under
the FAIR Act. The world price effect is likely to be especially small for wheat,
given the small share of the USA in world wheat markets and the long run
nature of the estimates of supply impacts, which allow for full adjustments on
the markets. Production of soybeans is likely to fall slightly as fully coupled
loan payments are reduced and the partially decoupled direct payments are
added. Prices of soybeans and soybean products may be slightly higher than
under the old law, but note, this suggests only a slight readjustment after a large
increase in soybean production and far lower prices in recent years. The pro-
duction for cotton and rice are likely to be slightly higher due in part to the
update of bases and yields and the anticipation of future base adjustments.
The best summary of these impacts is that they are small relative to the devasta-
tion to world markets that was predicted in the rhetoric accompanying
this legislation. The impacts of the FSRIA will be very hard to isolate amid
the normal ﬂux of world markets (Sumner and Lee 2000).
6. The new dairy payment program
A major innovation in the FSRIA concerns a new dairy payment scheme.
The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program contains a deﬁciency
Table 3 Direct commodity market effects of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
Production (%) USA price (%) World price (%)
Wheat < 1 ~ -1<   -1
Corn and feed grains < 1 ~ -1<   -1
Soybeans ~ -2~  3 <  2
Cotton < 1 ~ -1<   -1
Rice < 1 ~ -1~  0Implications of US Farm Bill 115
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payment that distributes payments likely to be equivalent to between 5 and
10 per cent of total milk revenue for fully eligible dairy farms. The effect of
the MILC payments on the USA dairy situation depends on three related
issues: the size of the payment, the effect of the payment on milk supply
and the effect of any supply response on milk prices. Initially we must
understand the basics of the program.
The MILC payment rate in any month depends on the regulated mini-
mum price of ﬂuid drinking milk in Boston in that month. The payment
rate per 100 pounds (cwt.) of milk is
MILC payment = max[0, (0.45(#16.94 - Boston Class minimum 
wholesale ﬂuid milk price)].
Although the law speciﬁes the Boston price, actually the payments are tied
to national prices for manufactured milk prices because the Federal Milk
Marketing Order system sets the Boston Class 1 price to be equal to a base
price that depends directly on movements in manufactured milk product
prices plus #3.25 per cwt.
Figure 2 depicts a histogram of the monthly payment rate calculated as if
it were in effect from July 1995 through September 2002. The payment rate
would have been 0 in 23 of the 87 months considered and would have been
#1.00 or more in 28 of 87 months. Of course with a positive subsidy, the
supply response would generate more milk and lower prices so this histo-
gram underestimates the likely payments from the new program.
The production subsidy element depends on an additional feature of the law.
Payments are limited to a maximum of 2.4 million pounds per operation in
a year. This limit affects few producers in the New England region and a
Figure 2 MILC payments based on historical data, 7/1995–9/2002. Payment calculated as max
[0, 0.45* (#16.94 – Boston Class 1 Price )]116 D.A. Sumner
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minority of producers in the Upper Midwest. But, almost all producers in
the West will ﬁnd their payments limited to the maximum. Consider two cases:
‘small’ producers, for whom the 2.4 million pounds per year limit is more than
annual production and ‘large’ producers, for whom the limit is certain to bind.
In Figure 3, Ssmall represents milk supply from all ‘small’ producers. Slarge
represents milk supply from all ‘large’ producers (Slarge is everywhere lower
than Ssmall, indicating lower marginal cost of production on large farms); D
is aggregate milk demand. In the absence of the MILC, aggregate supply is
found as the horizontal sum of Ssmall and Slarge, and is denoted as Stotal,0. The
equilibrium price is P0, so that the quantity supplied from small producers
is Qsmall,0, and the quantity supplied from large producers is Qlarge,0. Total
quantity supplied is Qtotal,0.
Now (in order to save space) reconsider Figure 3 as applying to individual
farms. The policy sets price TP for units up to QLIMIT per farm. For the small
producers, QLIMIT is non-binding; TP becomes the marginal price for small
producers, ﬁxing the quantity supplied from these producers at Qsmall,1. For
large producers, QLIMIT is infra-marginal.
Under these conditions, aggregate supply (the horizontal sum of the indi-
vidual farm supplies of each type) can now be found by shifting Stotal to the right
by quantity Qsmall (TP) - Qsmall(P), resulting in aggregate supply Stotal,1. The new
equilibrium price is P1, lower than P0. As the market price is the large pro-
ducers’ marginal price, supply from large producers is reduced to Qlarge,1.
Figure 3 Effect of MILC USA milk marketsImplications of US Farm Bill 117
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Table 4 presents average annual milk production per farm for the USA,
Vermont, Wisconsin and California. Annual average production per farm
for Vermont and Wisconsin is well below the 2.4 million pound limit on
MILC payments. Thus, even if the payments were made in all 12 months in
a year, the average farms in Vermont and Wisconsin would ﬁt the ‘small’
farm case described above and would increase production in response to
the MILC payment. Average annual production per farm in California is
more than 15 million pounds per year. Thus, even if the payment were
active in only 3 months of the year (ignoring seasonality in production,
dividing by 12), the average farm in California would ﬁt the ‘large’ farm
case described.
For the larger farms producing about 70 per cent of the milk in the USA,
the program is equivalent to a lump sum infra-marginal payment where the
size of the payment is inversely related to the price of milk. It is not yet
clear how this program will be treated in WTO notiﬁcations, but it is likely
that the whole amount will be considered product speciﬁc amber box pay-
ments that enter the AMS.
Putting these pieces together we get a 10 per cent per unit revenue
increase for about 30 per cent of production. With a supply elasticity of 1.0
that suggests a direct supply effect of about 3 per cent with a smaller
equilibrium impact and reduced production on the large farms. The USA
price of milk will be down a few percentage points, but the implications for
world markets is smaller because USA trade barriers for dairy products
imply minor effects on imports or exports. One international implication is
somewhat smaller quota rents for ﬁrms that shift dairy products to the
USA under quota.
7. Implications of the FSRI act of 2002 for WTO compliance
The ﬁrst major WTO issue relates to the color of the domestic support
‘box’ in which to place the various farm bill payments. When that question
Table 4 Average milk production per dairy operation, 2001
USA California Vermont Wisconsin
Milk cows
1 (head)  9115 1555  153  1292
Operations
2 97 560 2157 1600 17 833
Cows/operation  93     721 95  72
Milk/cow/year
1 (pounds) 18 139 20 913 17 431 17 182
Milk/farm/year (pounds)  1687 15 078  1656  1237
1 From Milk Production, Disposition, and Income 2001 Summary.
2 Wisconsin data from NASS-Wisconsin, California data from California Department of Food and
Agriculture.118 D.A. Sumner
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is answered, the relevant question becomes, what can the USA do to meet its
URAA commitments of keeping its AMS below #19.1 billion? (Becker 2002).
Clearly the marketing loans remain in the AMS and because loan rates
were raised for corn and wheat and lowered for soybeans this could raise or
lower loan outlays and the contribution to the AMS. In any case the
expected net effect is small. Note, however, with net increases in production
and lower loan repayment rates, the contribution to the AMS can be larger
for those reasons as well. The other major contribution to the AMS has been
the dairy, sugar and peanut price supports. In addition, a new deﬁciency
payment for dairy producers (about #1 billion per year) will add to the
AMS. The new payment program for peanuts also adds to the AMS in this
way. The impact so far seems to be a small net increase in the product
speciﬁc AMS, depending on what the weather does to prices and hence the
size of payments.
Next, turn to the direct payments for grains and cotton. The updating of
area bases for the new direct payments has raised concerns that these pay-
ments should belong in the WTO amber box. If the USA declares them in
the ‘green box’ there would likely be WTO challenges. The USA argument
is that some update was required because soybeans were added to the pro-
gram and thus the updates only minimally distort production because
farmers may still leave the land idle or plant a large variety of crops. The
example cited found that with reasonable numbers the payments were
about 80 per cent decoupled. It seems a close call to argue that the produc-
tion effect of the expectation of future updates 6 or more years into the
future has a large production distorting effect. But, this may be a case that
requires litigation. Note in any case, if these payments (worth about #4 bil-
lion per year) were considered ‘amber box’, they would be declared NPS
and thus be ‘charged’ against the de minimis limit which is about #10 bil-
lion. This would represent a large share of a rapidly ﬁlling box.
The new CCP raises even more concerns about the box they are likely to
enter. These payments allow updating of both the base area and base yield
and are calculated in relation to the current market price of a speciﬁc com-
modity. Therefore, even though the land may be left idle or other crops may
be planted, it may be hard for the USA to successfully argue that these pay-
ments are in the green box. This is especially true given that the USA
reported the MLA payment to be NPS amber. These payments are also
likely to be in the range of #4 billion per year, so if they are NPS, that box
is already overﬂowing (given crop insurance and a number of minor subsi-
dies in that class). There is another argument, however, that even though
the CCP are not tied explicitly to current planting, they are tied to a spe-
ciﬁc crop price, and, with base updating, they are tied to lagged output of
a speciﬁc crop. Therefore, they should be in the commodity-speciﬁc amberImplications of US Farm Bill 119
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category and be added directly to the AMS. This would mean that they
would be charged against the #19.1 billion limit.
A ﬁnal issue concerns the new Conservation Security Payments. As
argued, these payments may be considered tied to production and likely to
stimulate production. That view would suggest that these payments also
belong in the amber box as NPS payments. But, of course, because they are
listed as conservation program payments the USA may argue they belong
in the green box. These payments are likely to be only about #200 million
per year so they only have a marginal effect.
The product speciﬁc subsidy in the loan beneﬁts and dairy payments and
price supports may already get close to the #19.1 billion limit in high-output
low-price years. That problem would be worse if the CCP were placed in that
category. However, if the CCP are NPS and the direct payments are also placed
in that category, the USA may easily exceed the approximate #10 billion
ceiling that is available for de minimis NPS amber support. If that were the
case, all this NPS support would be placed in the AMS, and the URAA
limit would be easily exceeded. Thus the USA may have a delicate balancing
act to report its various programs in the product-speciﬁc and NPS catego-
ries in order to minimize the chance the #19.1 billion limit is exceeded.
My view is that there are probably WTO-acceptable ways to report the
USA programs that would minimise the prospect of exceeding the limit.
One way to reduce the current NPS subsidy reported is to shift some pay-
ments or beneﬁts (such as a part of crop insurance subsidy, some grazing
fees and even a part of the CCP) into the product-speciﬁc category. For
those commodities with less than 5 per cent support, this step would take
those subsidies out of consideration and leave more room for the direct
payments or perhaps the CCP to ﬁt within the NPS de minimis. That idea
would apply for crop insurance for fruits and for grazing fees. Of course,
this approach may imply additional problems for the product-speciﬁc
amber support that is now reported in the AMS. One way to reduce the
product-speciﬁc amber subsidy is to adjust the way price support policies
for sugar and dairy are operated. For these commodities the real support
comes from the import barriers. But, because the AMS is calculated as a
difference between the support price and the ﬁxed world reference price, the
AMS for dairy and sugar, in particular, is very large relative to the beneﬁt
received by producers. It would be relatively simple to compensate produc-
ers with less than #1 billion for a shift in the price support policy and thus
drop the USA AMS by about #4 billion (See Table 1).
Finally, remember that the ‘circuit-breaker’ provision mentioned requires
the USDA to assure that WTO obligations are not exceeded. Thus, the
USA can argue that the bill is designed to ﬁt within the URAA limits, even
if it does not ﬁt within the spirit of reducing subsidies and protection. That120 D.A. Sumner
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said, there is little doubt that the 2002 Act will be subject to WTO challenges.
The huge increase in USA farm subsidies over the past 4 years has raised
concerns in many nations. Some of these concerns pre-date the FSRIA and
these speciﬁc commodity claims may fare better than wholesale attacks on
the new law.
8. Implications of the FSRI act of 2002 for WTO negotiations
More important than the compliance with the URAA are the effects of the
FSRI Act of 2002 on the prospects for successful trade liberalisation in the
current WTO negotiations and elsewhere.
The new Farm Bill will possibly have several implications for these negoti-
ations. First, USA negotiators will now have less opportunity to agree to
lower domestic supports in exchange for additional market opening or
lower export subsidies. Particularly with the Congress watching the negoti-
ations closely, it would be difﬁcult for the negotiators to assure successful
passage of implementation legislation if a new WTO agreement clearly
forced rewriting of the farm program. (The USA elections in November
2002, which shifted the control of the USA Senate to Republicans, did not
change this point signiﬁcantly.) Second, some other countries now see the
USA as a major source of distortion in world markets and will focus atten-
tion on negotiating lower USA subsidies while devoting less effort to open-
ing markets in places such as Korea, Japan or Europe. The Cairns group in
particular, by focusing on the US Farm Bill rather than import barriers in
the USA and other places may be focusing on the less important distor-
tions. Policies such as USA, Canadian and EU dairy trade barriers are
likely to face less pressure for reduction. Third, some countries, especially
in the developing world, are more likely to accept that production-distorting
farm subsidies are an essential part of agricultural policy and are more likely
to adopt such policies. None of these implications make it easier to achieve
more open world markets for agricultural trade.
A few comments collected in May by farm journalist Jim Wiesemeyer
(2002) from around the world reinforce these points. China’s vice minister
of trade Long Yongtu asked, ‘After the U.S. Congress adopted such a bill, why
can we not do similar things?’ He said USA actions like the Farm Bill have
already ‘had a negative impact on enforcement of China’s commitments to
the WTO’. The Financial Times of London begins its editorial on May 29,
2002, ‘With its new, grotesque farm subsidies, the U.S. has let the European
Union off the hook. Trade liberalization was supposed to be one of the dis-
ciplines that would push the EU to reform its absurd Common Agricultural
Policy. But having surrendered to protectionism, Washington is in no posi-
tion to ﬁght’. It later wrote, ‘Washington’s reversion to huge subsidies tiedImplications of US Farm Bill 121
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to production removes … pressure [for reform of the CAP] and leaves the
international campaign for agricultural reform with little hope’. The heads
of the WTO, World Bank and the IMF, in a joint letter, wrote, ‘How can
leaders in developing countries or in any capital argue for more open eco-
nomies if leadership in this area is not forthcoming from wealthy nations?’.
Despite these concerns, the core USA positions and strategy for the cur-
rent WTO negotiations following the Doha agreement did not change. The
USA negotiators have stated that they remain committed to reducing trade
barriers and opening markets through the WTO negotiation, in the negoti-
ations for free trade in the Americas, and elsewhere. In the July 2002 WTO
proposal, the USA called for the elimination of export subsidies and rapid
tariff cuts, especially for the highest tariffs. That proposal also called for
cuts in trade distorting domestic support that would impose changes on
USA programs and make it even harder for the FSRIA programs to ﬁt
under the WTO cap on domestic support. Notably this proposal garnered
strong expressions of support from major USA farm organisations.
Nonetheless, behind this negotiating position is the realisation that the
USA has enacted a farm bill that codiﬁes large farm subsidies well into the
future. Furthermore, much of USA agriculture and a large majority in
Congress strongly supported these programs. Therefore, negotiators must
devote effort not to opening markets, but to protecting USA farm pro-
grams. Indeed, negotiators must defend USA farm programs rather than
defend the long-term economic interests of USA farmers and especially the
interests of the least subsidised farmers, (leaving aside the broader interests
of USA taxpayers, consumers and the economy more generally).
A focus on domestic support rather than border measures by those inter-
ested in using the WTO to reform farm trade policy seems unfortunate to
me. I argue elsewhere that analysis and evidence shows that border meas-
ures typically have stronger trade impacts (Sumner 2000). Unfortunately,
among the most serious consequences of the FSRIA is that the informal
coalition of the USA and the Cairns group may be impaired. The positive
Australian response to the USA WTO proposal released in July 2002 sug-
gests that the damage may not have been permanent, but it is real nonethe-
less. Of course, certain agricultural interests welcome these implications.
Those countries and commodity interests that want little agricultural market
opening from the new WTO round, will welcome the weakened negotiating
position of the USA.
The ﬁnal implications are likely to be more delay in the current trade
round, smaller tariff cuts, less TRQ reform, and fewer other reforms. Per-
haps, ironically, these implications of the FSRIA for WTO negotiations
seem far more important than the relatively small production, trade and
price implications.122 D.A. Sumner
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